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Friends of Animals v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, 879 F.3d
1000 (9th Cir. 2018)
Bradley E. Tinker
In Friends of Animals v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, the
Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
allows for the removal of one species of bird to benefit another species.
Friends of Animals argued that the Service’s experiment permitting the
taking of one species––the barred owl––to advance the conservation of a
different species––the northern spotted owl––violated the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act. The court, however, found that the Act delegates broad
implementing discretion to the Secretary of the Interior, and neither the
Act nor the underlying international conventions limit the taking of a
particular species to enhance conservation of another species. In affirming
the district court’s ruling, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Service’s
conclusions and granted summary judgment in their favor.
I. INTRODUCTION
Friends of Animals and Predator Defense (collectively, “Friends”)
are non-profit organizations advocating for animals protected by the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(“MBTA”), along with other conventions.1 In 2014, Friends challenged a
Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”) scientific collecting permit, arguing
that the permit violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
and the MBTA. Friends argued that the Service's permit, which allowed
the taking of one bird to benefit another, was unlawful because neither the
MBTA nor any foundational migratory bird conventions expressly allow
the Service to take a migratory bird unless to advance conservation of that
species.2 The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, however,
granted summary judgment for the Service. 3 Friends appealed pressing
only the MBTA claim. 4
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
decision and granted summary judgment for the Service on three main
grounds.5 First, MBTA language did not support Friends’ argument.6
Second, the underlying convention protecting owls––the Mexico
Convention––failed to support Friends’ argument.7 Lastly, the court
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determined that “slippery slope” concerns over the Service’s action were
ufounded because adequate and proper backstops were in place.8
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1990, the Service determined the northern spotted owl (“NSO”)
was a threatened species under the ESA.9 NSO population decline
primarily tracked removal of old-growth forest, their principal habitat.
Remaining NSO populations suffered further when barred owls, native to
the eastern United States, began encroaching on increasingly scarce NSO
habitat from the east.10 Because of the barred owl’s better adaptability, it
eventually came to greatly outnumber the NSO and consume up to 76
percent of the two species’ shared diet.11 Barred owls even began
physically attacking NSOs at times.12 Consequently, NSO populations
continued declining and dispersing.13
A. Recovery
In 2008, the Service created a recovery plan for the NSO.14 The
Service acknowledged that habitat destruction was responsible for the
decline in the NSO population..15 Although that plan focused significantly
on habitat preservation, the Service also concluded that, “the barred owl
constitutes a significantly greater threat to spotted owl recovery than was
envisioned when the spotted owl was listed in 1990,” and, “[a]s a result,
the Service recommend[ed] specific actions to address the barred owl
threat.”16 In areas of greatest NSO concentration, the Service planned to
remove barred owls and determine the effects of that change on NSO site
occupancy, reproduction, and survival.17 In 2014, the Service granted the
Oregon Fish and Wildlife Office a scientific collecting permit for 1,600
barred owls.18
B. The Four International Conventions On Migratory Birds
The MBTA references four conventions for the protection of
migratory birds with Canada, Mexico, Russia, and Japan.19 Each
convention is a bilateral treaty between the United States and one specific
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country.20 The Mexico Convention is the only one that provides protection
for owls, and as such, the Mexico Convention was the only convention
analyzed by the Court.21 Article II of the Mexico Convention establishes
“close[d] seasons” that prohibit taking migratory birds during certain
seasons, with an exception under three circumstances, one of which allows
taking for scientific purposes.22
C. Procedural Posture
In 2014, Friends brought this suit claiming the Oregon Fish and
Wildlife Office’s permit violated the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) and the MBTA.23 Friends dropped the NEPA aspect of their
claim when they appealed to the Ninth Circuit.24 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Service on both of Friends’ claims, and
Friends appealed the ruling as it pertained to the MBTA. In its ruling, the
district court concluded that Friends’ same-species theory was
unsupported because “nothing in the MBTA or the international
conventions it implements limits scientific purposes to the species
taken.”25
The main purpose of the recovery plan is to eliminate the barred
owl from the most concentrated habitats of the NSO.26 Friends argued this
does not constitute “use[d] for scientific research,” which Friends argued
is the point of the “same-species theory” provision within the MBTA and
underlying conventions.27 The group also contended that MBTA and
Mexico Convention language does not allow the Service to grant the
scientific collection permit because when the Service "permits take for
scientific purposes, the action must be intended to advance the
conservation or scientific understanding of the very species being taken."28
III. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment
de novo and came to similar conclusions as the lower court on each of
Friends’ arguments.29 The court first analyzed Friends’ argument in the
context of the authority given to the Service and its broad discretion to
grant the permit and interpret the meaning of the language of the MBTA.30
Second, the court looked at the language of the Mexico Convention and
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whether there was a limitation to enforce same-species takings. 31 Third,
the court held that the Service’s interpretation of “used’’ was consistent
with the language in the Mexico Convention. 32 Lastly, the court found
provisions in place to control the abuse of takings of species not listed on
the scientific collection permit. 33
A. Broad Discretion Under the MBTA
The MBTA regulates takings for migratory birds, except as
permitted by the act.34 Under 16 U.S.C. § 703(a), the Secretary of the
Interior is “authorized and directed to determine” when the conventions
may allow taking and thereby “adopts suitable regulations permitting and
governing the same.”35 Also relevant was 50 C.F.R. 21.23, which governs
the Service’s issuance of scientific collecting permits for the taking of
birds for “scientific or educational purposes.” 36 Permits must describe
“species and number of birds to be taken, the location of the collection, the
purpose of the research, and the institution to which species will ultimately
be donated.” 37 The section also specifies that this applies to all migratory
birds, and that the birds must be donated and transferred to the public,
scientific, or educational institution in compliance with the permit.38
In reviewing the MBTA and the Secretary’s authority, the court
found that the Act imposes few substantive conditions itself, but rather
delegates to the Secretary broad discretion to implement the act.39 Further,
neither the Act nor the regulation supported Friends’ same-species
theory.40
B. The Service’s Plan was Specimen-Specific, Not Same-Species
Friends’ primary argument, its same-species theory, was that
language in the Mexico Convention required the taking of a bird be only
for scientific purposes regarding that bird, and that the MBTA’s
consistency provisions mandated compliance with that requirement.41 The
MBTA’s “consistency provisions” dictate that regulations are “subject to
the provisions [of]” and must act to further the “purposes of the
conventions.” 42 Friends relied on the Mexico Convention’s language in
Article II(A) providing that the only exception for taking a migratory bird
is when it is “used for scientific purposes, for propagation or for
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museums.” 43 Friends argued that because the Service’s NSO recovery
plan required taking barred owls to help the NSO, such taking was
therefore not for a scientific purpose specific to the barred owl, thus
violating the convention.44
Friends relied on language in the Mexico Convention as its sole
cause of action, and argued that “used for scientific purposes” mandates
that a permitted take must be of the same species listed in the permit and
to advance the conservation of that species.45 Friends maintained that the
language in the Mexico Convention bolstered their argument and provided
a cause of action to protect the barred owl from being taken without
benefiting conservation or scientific advancement of that particular
species.46 In the Service recovery plan, the scientific purpose related to the
NSO rather than the barred owl.47 Friends concluded and argued that the
permit impermissibly allowed barred owl take, even though no scientific
research was directed at that species.48
The court bifurcated this argument into specimen-specific and
same-species interpretations.49 Specimen-specific permits are allowable,
but same-species permits are not under the Mexico Convention.50
Examples of specimen-specific permits are those where migratory birds
are taken for scientific purposes, such as studying human hearing (barn
owl) and aerodynamics (hummingbird).51 In those cases, the scientific
collection permits listed the species but had nothing to do with its
advancement, yet the take still qualified as a permissible scientific
purpose. The court found this analogous to the case at hand.52
C. The Service’s Interpretation of “Used” Is Consistent With the
Mexico Convention
In distinguishing same-species from specimen-specific, the court
analyzed the meaning of the word “used” in the phrase “used for scientific
purposes.”53 First, the court analyzed the word “used” according to “its
ordinary or natural meaning, concluding the Mexico Convention allows a
bird to be “employed” even if it is “to procure its demise . . . [and it] . . . is
not the subject of scientific experiment.”54 However, due to remaining
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ambiguity after the plain meaning analysis, the court continued analyzing
the meaning of “used.”55
The court next reviewed the word “used” in the context of the rest
of the Mexico Convention’s language because “interpretation of legal text
is a holistic endeavor.”56 In doing so, the court concluded that “read in full
context of Articles I and II, it clearly encompasses a controlled scientific
study to save a threatened species covered by the Convention when that
study” will have a negligible effect on the taken species population.57
Lastly, the court rejected Friends’ argument that the canon of
noscitur a sociis compelled the same-species argument. Noscitur a sociis
stands for the proposition that “words grouped in a list should be given
related meaning.”58 Friends claimed that Article II(A)’s exception
requires that the phrase “used for scientific purposes . . . be read to be
limited by the other elements in that series,” such as “for propagation or
for museums” because if one is taking a bird for propagation or for
museums, it must be “used for the propagative or museum purpose;”
thus, if a bird is taken for a scientific purpose, similar restrictions should
apply by requiring the scientific purpose be for the bird taken. 59
However, the court found the words “‘scientific purposes,’
‘propagation,’ and ‘museums’ are sufficiently distinct that there is no
obvious common denominator among them” for the canon to apply.60
Even if it did apply, the court held it failed to support Friends’ argument
because such a reading would be contrary to the Mexico Convention’s
Article I’s language that “articulate[s] aims to assure that protected
‘species may not be exterminated.’”61 Thus, “to promote a broad set of
uses” such a narrow reading of “scientific purposes” was unjustified.62
D. The Service’s Interpretation Does Not Lead to A Slippery Slope
Lastly, the court rejected Friends’ argument that “the Service’s
loose definition of scientific purposes invites a slippery slope, and this
position would allow for an entire migratory bird species to be
exterminated so long as there is a scientific basis to do so.”63 The court
agreed with the Service that there is a “backstop against Friends’ parade
of horribles,” concluding that reading “Articles I and II of the Mexico
Convention in concert, they require that parties ‘establish laws, regulations
and provisions’ to assure that covered ‘species may not be
exterminated.’”64 Therefore, the court concluded that the Mexico
55
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Convention’s conservation purpose could be achieved “without reading
into it a same-species limitation that is unsupported by its text.”65
The court again referred to the language of Articles I and II from
the Mexico Convention, which explicitly requires that parties “establish
laws, regulations, and provisions so that a species may not be
exterminated.”66 The court concluded that this slippery-slope argument did
not advance the issue of whether a permitted take is limited to the samespecies.67
IV. CONCLUSION
A major implication of the court’s holding is the broad level of
agency discretion when interpreting statutes. Allowing the take of an
animal without any scientific use required may result in agency overreach.
So long as the courts use judicial boundaries, the taking of an endangered
animal can be legally sound.
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